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THE RIGHT TO APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION MADE ON
AN INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION
The Immediate Aftermath of the 2010 Amendments
One of the main reasons for amending the Supreme Court of
Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) in 2010 was to
introduce a calibrated approach towards interlocutory
appeals to the Court of Appeal. The amended s 34 and the
newly introduced Fourth and Fifth Scheds were interpreted
for the first time in two recent Court of Appeal decisions,
providing much needed guidance on the general approach
towards statutory interpretation, as well as specific direction
in terms of interpreting the term "order" in para (i) of the
Fourth Sched and para (e) of the Fifth Sched, and the term
"interlocutory application" in para (e) of the Fifth Sched.
However, some important questions remain to be answered,
such as those relating to the meaning of the purposive
approach, the framework to determine what are "interlocutory
orders" and "interlocutory applications", the relationship
between the relevant provisions in the Rules of Court
(Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) relating to leave to appeal and
the primary legislation, as well as the extent of possible future
legislative change.
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I. Introduction
1 Singapore's Supreme Court of Judicature Act ("SCJA") was
amended in 2010 vide the Supreme Court of Judicature (Amendment)
Act 2010 ("2010 SCJA amendments").2 One key provision that saw
change was s 34, which bears the ostensibly straightforward heading
"Matters that are non-appealable or appealable only with leave".
1 Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed.
2 Act 30 of 2010.
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2 This change came about as one of the perennial conundrums in
civil litigation is the extent to which appeals should be permitted to be
brought to the appellate courts;' indeed, the primary purpose of
amending s 34 was to introduce a calibrated approach towards
interlocutory appeals to the Court of Appeal (the apex court in
Singapore) in order to strike a better balance between utilising the
Court of Appeal's resources to hear appeals from interlocutory
applications concerning trite principles of law and allowing the Court of
Appeal to continue developing the jurisprudence on critical areas of
civil procedure law that may arise in interlocutory applications.4
3 The amended s 34 was interpreted for the first time in two
recent decisions by the Court of Appea 5 released just a couple of weeks
apart: OpenNet Pte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of
Singapore ("OpenNet")6 and Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group
Pte Ltd ("Dorsey James Michael") .
4 This piece analyses the reasoning in both decisions and also
raises certain questions that hopefully can be resolved in due course.
Before that is done, however, it is necessary to understand how and why
the provisions relating to appeal in the SCJA had changed.
3 See Jeffrey Pinsler, Principles of Civil Procedure (Academy Publishing, 2013)
at pp 917-918:
It might be argued that the parties should accept the decision given by a first
instance court and that the availability of an appeal is an unnecessary luxury.
The grounds for such a view could include: the rigorous and comprehensive
nature of civil litigation which produces correct first instance decisions most
of the time ... ; the unnecessary extension of litigation, as when a party is
intent on achieving the result he wants irrespective of the merits, or when his
motivation is to delay the enforcement of judgment which has been given
against him or to simply protract the dispute; the costs which would have to
be incurred in the course of the appeal and the related point that often only
parties who are financially well-positioned can take their cases to the Court of
Appeal ...; the real possibility that the original dispute maybe adapted by new
issues, evidence and amendments so that there is a shift in the scope of the
adjudication; and the public's perception of inconsistencies within the court
system when a higher court disagrees with a lower court.
4 Teo Guan Siew, "Recent Amendments to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act and
the Subordinate Courts Act" (January 2011) Singapore Law Gazette <http://www.
lawgazette.com.sg/201 1-01/featurel.htm> (accessed 5 May 2013).
5 In the first case, the Court of Appeal comprised Chao Hick Tin, Andrew Phang and
V K Rajah JJA. In the second case, the Court of Appeal comprised Sundaresh
Menon CJ, and Chao Hick Tin and V K Rajah JJA.
6 [2013] 2 SLR 880.
7 [2013]3 SLR 354.
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II. The Statutory Scheme
A. Before the 2010 amendments
5 For the larger part of our history, appeals to the Court of Appeal
in Singapore were subject to the principle that an appeal did not lie in
respect of an interlocutory order in chambers unless the judge had
certified after an application for further argument in court that he
required no further argument.8
6 In this regard, the Court of Appeal in Singapore Press Holdings
Ltd v Brown Noel Trading Pte Ltd' had explained that this requirement
for certification contemplated situations in which appeals from
interlocutory orders "may have arisen from full arguments not being
presented to the judge in chambers due to the shortness of time
available for the hearing of such applications or due to the judge in
chambers having to decide on an issue without the time available to him
for mature consideration".0
7 Previous versions of the SCJA also contained provisions
governing matters that were appealable as of right, non-appealable or
appealable only with leave. Over the years, the categories of cases where
an automatic right of appeal lay to the Court of Appeal were narrowed,
and those disqualifying an appeal to the Court of Appeal or requiring
leave increased.
8 In introducing some of these earlier legislative amendments,
Parliament had stated that their purpose was to check, screen or sieve
out the number of unmeritorious, unimportant or non-serious appeals,
especially on interlocutory matters."
8 Jeffrey Pinsler, Civil Justice in Singapore - Developments in the Course of the
20th Century (Butterworths Asia, 2000) at p 372, citing s 23(1) of the Courts
Ordinance 1934 (Act 17 of 1934) and s 30(2) of the Courts Ordinance 1955 (Cap 3,
1955 Ed) as early formulations of the principle. More recent formulations were
s 34(2) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed) and
s 34(1)(c) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Amendment) Act 1993 (Act 16 of
1993).
9 [1994] 3 SLR(R) 114.
10 Singapore Press Holdings Ltd v Brown Noel Trading Pte Ltd [1994] 3 SLR(R) 114
at [40], cited in Lim Chi Szu Margaret v Risis Pte Ltd [2006] 1 SLR(R) 300 at [31];
cf Downeredi Works Pte Ltd (formerly known as Works Infrastructure Pte Ltd) v
Holcim (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 1 SLR(R) 1070 at [22]-[25].
11 See Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (12 April 1993) vol 61 at col 96
(Professor S Jayakumar, Minister for Law) and Singapore Parliamentary Debates,
Official Report (26 November 1998) vol 69 at col 1630 (Professor S Jayakumar,
Minister for Law).
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9 Before the 2010 SCJA amendments, the right of appeal to the
Court of Appeal in respect of interlocutory orders was found in
s 34(1) (c) of the then-existing SCJA. 12 That provision stated that no
appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal "where a judge makes an
interlocutory order in chambers unless the Judge has certified, on
application within seven days after the making of the order by any party
for further argument in court, that he requires no further argument".
10 This meant that where a judge-made order in chambers was
concerned, it was crucial, in determining the extent of one's right to
appeal, whether that order could be classified as "final" or "interlocutory";
where an order was "interlocutory", it would only be appealable to
the Court of Appeal if the no-further-arguments-required certification
was obtained.
11 However, once the requisite certification was obtained, the
default position for orders made in interlocutory applications was that
they were appealable as of right to the Court of Appeal unless otherwise
provided for.13
12 In the larger scheme of the SCJA, pursuant to s 29A(1), "final"
orders of a judge in chambers were appealable as of right, along with all
other orders that were not subject to exceptions in the SCJA requiring
leave to appeal or providing that there was no right to appeal.
13 The categories of cases which were non-appealable (excluding
"interlocutory" orders made by a judge in chambers where the appellant
failed to obtain the no-further-arguments-required certification) were
as follows:
(a) Where a judge made an order giving unconditional
leave to defend an action or an order setting aside
unconditionally a default judgment."
(b) Where the appellant was the plaintiff and a judge made
an order giving leave to defend on condition that the defendant
paid into court or gives security for the sum claimed or an order
setting aside a default judgment on condition as aforesaid.5
(c) Where the judgment or order was made by consent of
the parties.
12 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed).
13 Teo Guan Siew, "Recent Amendments to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act and
the Subordinate Courts Act" (January 2011) Singapore Law Gazette <http://www.law
gazette.com.sg/201 1-01/featurel.htm> (accessed 5 May 2013).
14 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed) s 34(1)(a).
15 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed) s 34(1)(b).
16 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed) s 34(1)(d).
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(d) Where written law declared the judgment or order to be
final."
14 The categories of cases where leave to appeal was required were
as follows:
(a) Where the amount or value of the subject-matter at the
trial in dispute was less than $250,000.18
(b) Where the only issue in the appeal related to costs or
fees for hearing dates."
(c) Where a judge in chambers made a decision in a
summary way on an interpleader summons where the facts were
not in dispute.20
(d) An order was made refusing to strike out an action or a
pleading or part of a pleading.21
15 As summarised in Dorsey James Michael, there were essentially
three problems with this scheme.
16 First, there was considerable uncertainty as to the meaning of
"interlocutory order".22
17 Second, although the no-further-arguments certification had a
rational basis, in practice, a majority of further arguments did not raise
fresh arguments and the failure to obtain the certification in time had
potentially draconian effects on a party's right to appeal.23
18 Third, there was an upward trend in appeals to the Court of
Appeal in respect of interlocutory orders, leading to a strain on the
Court of Appeal to hear other appeals against judgments and final
orders, delays in case management, and the unsatisfactory position that
there were effectively two levels of appeal for interlocutory orders but
only one for judgments or final orders.24
17 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed) s 34(1)(e).
18 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed) s 34(2)(a).
19 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed) s 34(2)(b).
20 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed) s 34(2)(c).
21 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed) s 34(2)(d).
22 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [27]-[29].
23 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [30]-[33].
24 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [34]-[40].
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B. After the 2010 amendments
19 Accordingly, after careful consideration by two Committees led
by the Judiciary - the Law Reform Committee of the Singapore
Academy of Law chaired by Judith Prakash J, and the Committee to
Review and Update the SCJA and the Subordinate Courts Act chaired by
Chao Hick Tin JA - recommendations were made which led to the 2010
SCJA amendments.25
20 These recommendations were aimed, inter alia, at "streamlining
of appeals to the Court of Appeal arising from interlocutory
applications" 26 to strike a better balance between "maximising the use of
the Court of Appeal's limited resources so that it can focus on
substantive cases that help shape legal jurisprudence and, at the same
time, allowing it to continue to shape [Singapore] jurisprudence in the
area of interlocutory applications.27
21 The 2010 SCJA amendments essentially embodied a new three-
pronged calibrated approach towards appeals to the Court of Appeal.28
22 Under this approach, to determine whether an order made on
an interlocutory application was appealable to the Court of Appeal, one
would have to determine which of the following three categories the
order fell within: (a) non-appealable matters; (b) matters appealable
only with leave of court; or (c) matters appealable as of right to the
Court of Appeal.29
23 Non-appealable matters are listed in s 34(1) of the SCJA and
comprise the following:
(a) Where a judge makes an order specified in the
Fourth Sched, except in such circumstances as may be specified
in that Sched.so
25 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [23].
26 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (18 October 2010) vol 87 at col 1367
(Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee, Senior Minister of State, Ministry of Law and
Ministry of Home Affairs).
27 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (18 October 2010) vol 87 at col 1395
(Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee, Senior Minister of State, Ministry of Law and
Ministry of Home Affairs).
28 See Chua Hui Han, Eunice, "Defining an 'Interlocutory Application' - OpenNet Pte
Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013] SGCA 24"
(April 2013) Issue 2 Singapore Law Watch Commentary at 1-3 <http://www.singapore
lawwatch.com/slw/index.php/commentaries> (accessed 5 May 2013).
29 Teo Guan Siew, "Recent Amendments to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act and
the Subordinate Courts Act" (January 2011) Singapore Law Gazette <http://www.law
gazette.com.sg/201 1-01/featurel.htm> (accessed 5 May 2013).
30 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) s 34(1)(a).
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(b) Where the judgment or order is made by consent of the
parties.
(c) Where written law declares the judgment or order to be
final.32
24 The main difference with the previous version of the SCJA was
that the reference to specific types of orders (relating to unconditional
or conditional leave to defend an action and setting aside
unconditionally a default judgment or on certain conditions being
imposed) and the broad category of "interlocutory" orders made by a
judge in chambers where the appellant failed to obtain the no-further-
arguments-required certification had been deleted and replaced with a
list of orders specified in the Fourth Sched.
25 However, the Fourth Sched itself contains certain exceptions. It
states that no appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal in the
following cases:
(a) where a Judge makes an order giving unconditional leave to
defend any proceedings;
(b) where a Judge makes an order giving leave to defend any
proceedings on condition that the party defending those proceedings
pays into court or gives security for the sum claimed, except if the
appellant is that party;
(c) where a Judge makes an order setting aside unconditionally a
default judgment, regardless of how the default judgment was
obtained (including whether by reason of a breach of an order of
court or otherwise);
(d) where a Judge makes an order setting aside a default
judgment on condition that the party against whom the judgment had
been entered pays into court or gives security for the sum claimed,
regardless of how the default judgment was obtained (including
whether by reason of a breach of an order of court or otherwise),
except if the appellant is that party;
(e) where a Judge makes an order refusing to strike out -
(i) an action or a matter commenced by a writ of
summons or by any other originating process; or
(ii) a pleading or a part of a pleading;
(f) where a Judge makes an order giving or refusing further and
better particulars;
(g) where a Judge makes an order giving leave to amend a
pleading, except if -
31 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) s 34(1)(d).
32 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) s 34(1)(e).
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(i) the application for such leave is made after the
expiry of any relevant period of limitation current at the date
of issue of the writ of summons; and
(ii) the amendment is an amendment to correct the
name of a party or to alter the capacity in which a party sues,
or the effect of the amendment will be to add or substitute a
new cause of action;
(h) where a Judge makes an order refusing security for costs;
(i) where a Judge makes an order giving or refusing
interrogatories.
26 One will notice from this list that (a) to (d) are equivalent to
ss 34(1)(a) and 34(1)(b) of the previous version of the SCJA. These
categories have been consolidated in the Fourth Sched together with
other types of interlocutory orders, thus representing only a change in
form but not substance.
27 However, para (e) is equivalent to s 34(2) (d) of the previous
version of the SCJA, meaning that one category of cases which had
previously been appealable with leave has now been made non-appealable.
28 On this list, (f) to (i) are new categories which have been
explicitly stated to be non-appealable. Before the 2010 SCJA amendments,
these would arguably have fallen within the category of "interlocutory"
orders that were appealable as of right once the no-further-arguments
certification had been obtained.
29 As for the exceptional categories of cases stated in the
Fourth Sched which are not non-appealable, one would have to take the
further step to determine if they fell within one of the categories of cases
where leave to appeal was required. If they did not, then they could be
appealable as of right.
30 Matters appealable only with leave of court are stated under
s 34(2) of the SCJA. They comprise the following categories of cases:
(a) Where the amount in dispute, or the value of the
subject-matter, at the hearing before the High Court (excluding
interest and costs) does not exceed $250,000.33
(b) Where the only issue in the appeal relates to costs or
fees for hearing dates.34
33 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) s 34(2)(a).
34 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) s 34(2)(b).
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(c) Where a judge in chambers makes a decision in a
summary way on an interpleader summons where the facts are
not in dispute.
(d) Where a judge makes an order specified in the
Fifth Sched, except in such circumstances as may be specified in
that Schedule.
(e) Where the High Court makes an order in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction with respect to any proceedings under
the Adoption of Children Act or under Pt VII, VIII or IX of the
Women's Charter.
31 In turn, the Fifth Sched of the SCJA provides that leave to
appeal to the Court of Appeal is required in the following cases:
(a) where a Judge makes an order refusing leave to amend a
pleading, except if -
(i) the application for such leave is made after the
expiry of any relevant period of limitation current at the date
of issue of the writ of summons; and
(ii) the amendment is an amendment to correct the
name of a party or to alter the capacity in which a party sues,
or the effect of the amendment will be to add or substitute a
new cause of action;
(b) where a Judge makes an order giving security for costs;
(c) where a Judge makes an order giving or refusing discovery or
inspection of documents;
(d) where a Judge makes an order refusing a stay of proceedings;
(e) where a Judge makes an order at the hearing of any
interlocutory application other than an application for any of the
following matters:
(i) for summary judgment;
(ii) to set aside a default judgment;
(iii) to strike out an action or a matter commenced
by a writ of summons or by any other originating process,
a pleading or a part of a pleading;
(iv) to dismiss an action or a matter commenced by a
writ of summons or by any other originating process;
(v) for further and better particulars;
35 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) s 34(2)(c).
36 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) s 34(2)(d).
37 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) s 34(2)(e).
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(vi) for leave to amend a pleading;
(vii) for security for costs;
(viii) for discovery or inspection of documents;
(ix) for interrogatories to be varied or withdrawn, or for
leave to serve interrogatories;
(x) for a stay of proceedings.
32 One can immediately observe that the category of cases where
leave to appeal is required has ballooned significantly - only ss 34(2) (a)
to 34(2) (c) have counterparts in the previous version of the SCJA.
33 Additionally, although the previous distinction between "final"
and "interlocutory" orders had been removed, para (e) of the Fifth Sched
introduced a new category of an order at the hearing of any interlocutory
application. This category of orders would require leave to appeal unless
they fell within a sub-list of specified matters.
34 As with the Fourth Sched, the Fifth Sched also contains
exceptions. Again, it is not immediately apparent if those categories
of cases mentioned as exceptions would be appealable as of right or
non-appealable. One would have to go through the exercise of
determining if these same categories appeared in the Fourth Sched
and if not, then by process of elimination they would be appealable as
of right.38
35 All in all, it is clear that after the 2010 SCJA amendments,
determining the extent to which an appeal to the Court of Appeal is
available now requires a fairly complex exercise of statutory interpretation.
III. The two recent decisions interpreting the new provisions
36 The two recent decisions of OpenNet and Dorsey James Michael
demonstrate this. They deal, most significantly, with the reference to
"order" in para (i) of the Fourth Sched to the SCJA, as well as the phrase
"an order at the hearing of any interlocutory application" in para (e) of
the Fifth Sched.
37 Additionally, the Court of Appeal in Dorsey James Michael gave
detailed guidance as to the general approach to be taken in applying s 34
38 Chua Hui Han, Eunice, "Defining an 'Interlocutory Application' - OpenNet Pte
Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013] SGCA 24"
(April 2013) Issue 2 Singapore Law Watch Commentary at 3 <http://www.singapore
lawwatch.com/slw/index.php/commentaries> (accessed 5 May 2013).
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and the Fourth and Fifth Scheds of the SCJA to particular types of
interlocutory orders.
A. OpenNet
38 The issue before the Court of Appeal in OpenNet" was whether
the appellant required leave to appeal against an order made by a High
Court judge in which leave to the appellant to commence judicial review
proceedings was refused.
39 The respondent argued, inter alia, that leave was required
because the application for leave to commence judicial review was an
"interlocutory application" under para (e) of the Fifth Sched of the
SCJA."
40 According to the respondent, an application for leave to
commence judicial review was "interlocutory" for three main reasons:
(a) it was "a preliminary step to the substantive application for judicial
review"; (b) it may be made by ex parte originating summons without
the respondent being heard; and (c) the appellant had proceeded on the
basis that the application was "interlocutory" because its affidavits in
support of the application for leave stated that they contained
statements of information or belief, which were admissible under 0 41
r 5 of the Rules of Court' for "interlocutory proceedings".42
41 The Court of Appeal quickly (and correctly) dismissed the
last reason on the basis that the appellant's subjective belief had no
bearing on the proper interpretation of "interlocutory application"
under the SCJA.e
42 It focused on how the SCJA should be interpreted instead. In
this regard, the Court of Appeal noted that the SCJA provided no
definition for the phrase "interlocutory application" and that a plain and
ordinary meaning of the phrase based on the definitions in various legal
dictionaries would seem to exclude an application for leave to
39 For a summary and commentary of the case, see Douglas Chi, "Clarification on
Leave to Appeal Regime in Respect of Interlocutory Matters - OpenNet Pte Ltd v
Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013] SGCA 24"
(April 2013) Issue 1 Singapore Law Watch Commentary <http://www.singaporelaw
watch.com/slw/index.php/commentaries> (accessed 5 May 2013).
40 OpenNet Pte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013]
2 SLR 880 at [11].
41 Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed. Order 41 r 5 bears the heading "Contents of affidavit".
42 OpenNet Pte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013]
2 SLR 880 at [11]-[12].
43 OpenNet Pte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013]
2 SLR 880 at [13].
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commence judicial review from the category of "interlocutory" because
there was no "main hearing determining the outcome of the case"."
43 More importantly, however, a purposive reading in context
pursuant to s 9A(1) of the Interpretation Act4 5 led to the same
conclusion.
44 The Court of Appeal discerned the purpose of the SCJA from
the second reading speech of then Senior Minister of State for Law,
Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee, where he had explained that under the
amended SCJA:"
Interlocutory applications will now be categorised based on their
importance to the substantive outcome of the case. With this calibrated
approach, some interlocutory orders will not be allowed to go to the
Court of Appeal, whilst others can only go to the Court of Appeal with
the permission of the High Court. The decision of the High Court
whether to grant permission is final. The right to appeal all the way to
the Court of Appeal will ... remain for interlocutory applications that
could affect the final outcome of the case. [emphasis added]
45 This approach ensured that interlocutory applications, which
usually do not involve novel or important points of law, were not
unnecessarily taken all the way to the Court of Appeal, leading to a
waste of judicial time.
46 The Court of Appeal found that this view was clearly reflected
in the SCJA itself, giving the examples of: (a) an application for
summary judgment where no appeal was allowed to the Court of
Appeal where the application was refused, but where no leave to appeal
was required where summary judgment is ordered; and (b) an application
to amend pleadings where no appeal may be brought to the Court of
Appeal where leave to amend was granted but where leave to appeal
may be obtained to appeal to the Court of Appeal where leave to amend
was refused."
44 OpenNet Pte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013]
2 SLR 880 at [14].
45 Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed.
46 OpenNet Pte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013]
2 SLR 880 at [17], quoting Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report
(18 October 2010) vol 87 at cols 1367-1395 (Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee,
Senior Minister of State, Ministry of Law and Ministry of Home Affairs).
47 OpenNet Pte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013]
2 SLR 880 at [18].
48 OpenNet Pte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013]
2 SLR 880 at [19]-[20].
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47 Applying this approach to an application for leave to commence
judicial review, the Court of Appeal held that because the refusal of leave
meant that there "was nothing more to proceed on" and that the
"substantive rights of the parties had come to an absolute end unless
there could be an appeal", the application for leave to commence judicial
review was not an "interlocutory application" under para (e) of the
Fifth Sched of the SCJA.49
48 Accordingly, no leave to appeal was required before the
appellant filed an appeal against the decision of the High Court refusing
leave to commence judicial review proceedings.
49 The Court of Appeal then proceeded to deal with the
respondent's other argument based on 0 53 r 8 of the Rules of Court,so
which reads as follows: "An appeal shall lie from an order made by a
Judge in Chambers under this Order as it does in the case of an
interlocutory order."
50 The respondent argued that 0 53 r 8 required an appeal against
a judge's order in an application for leave to commence judicial review
to be made in the same manner as an appeal against an interlocutory
order of a judge made in other proceedings, which was specified by
s 34(2) (d) of the SCJA read with para (e) of the Fifth Sched.:
51 In other words, the argument was that the appellant was
required to apply for leave from the High Court to appeal against the
judge's refusal to grant leave to commence judicial review. To read
"interlocutory application" under para (e) of the Fifth Sched to exclude
an application for leave to commence judicial review would render 0 53
r 8 "nugatory and otiose".52
52 The Court of Appeal disagreed. It compared 0 53 r 8 with its
predecessor provision, which revealed that the reference to "interlocutory
order" was to link it with the previous s 34(1) (c) of the SCJA containing
the requirement for a no-further-arguments certification for "an
interlocutory order" made by a judge in chambers.
49 OpenNetPte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013]
2 SLR 880 at [21].
50 Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed.
51 OpenNetPte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013]
2 SLR 880 at [23].
52 OpenNet Pte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013]
2 SLR 880 at [24].
53 OpenNet Pte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013]
2 SLR 880 at [26]-[27].
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53 Given that this provision had since been removed along with
the requirement for a no-further-arguments certification by the
2010 SCJA amendments, 0 53 r 8 was a "relic of the past" and could not
be used to undermine the strong parliamentary intention that an appeal
to the Court of Appeal will remain as of right for orders made at
interlocutory applications which will finally dispose of the substantive
rights of the parties.
54 Finally, the Court of Appeal dismissed the respondent's third
argument that there were compelling reasons why leave should be
required against decisions in applications for leave to commence judicial
review proceedings based on the low threshold for such an application
to succeed, in view of the "clear purpose underlying the relevant
provisions in the SCJA"-
55 Interestingly, the Court of Appeal made no reference to earlier
authorities interpreting the phrase "interlocutory order" to inform its
interpretation of the phrase "interlocutory application".' Both these
phrases became areas of focus in the subsequent decision of Dorsey
James Michael.
B. Dorsey James Michael
56 The main issue before the Court of Appeal in Dorsey James
Michael was whether the High Court judge's order that the respondent
be at liberty to serve on the appellant pre-action interrogatories pursuant
to 0 26A r 1 of the Rules of Court" and that the Appellant answer the
same was appealable.
57 The respondent argued that pre-action interrogatories were
"interrogatories" within the meaning of para (i) of the Fourth Sched
and hence an order of a judge giving such interrogatories was
non-appealable."
54 OpenNet Pte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013]
2 SLR 880 at [28]-[29]. See also Jeffrey Pinsler, Principles of Civil Procedure
(Academy Publishing, 2013) at pp 947-948.
55 OpenNet Pte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013]
2 SLR 880 at [30]-[32].
56 See Douglas Chi, "Clarification on Leave to Appeal Regime in Respect of Interlocutory
Matters - OpenNet Pte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of
Singapore [2013] SGCA 24" (April 2013) Issue 1 Singapore Law Watch Commentary
at 3-4 <http://www.singaporelawwatch.com/slw/index.php/commentaries> (accessed
5 May 2013).
57 Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed. Order 26A r 1 bears the heading "Interrogatories
against other person".
58 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [ 13].
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58 The respondent relied primarily on the plain and ordinary
meaning of the statutory text but also argued, in the alternative, that a
purposive interpretation would support its argument.
59 The Court of Appeal reaffirmed the locus classicus of Public
Prosecutor v Low Kok Henge and held that s 9A(1) of the Interpretation
Act" mandated that the courts take a purposive interpretation, which
must take precedence over any other common law principles of
statutory interpretation, including the plain meaning rule.62
60 Under the purposive approach, the Court of Appeal stated that
reference may be made to extrinsic materials such as parliamentary
debates even if, on a plain reading, the words of the statutory provision
are unambiguous or do not produce unreasonable or absurd results.
61 The Court of Appeal then turned to extrinsic materials to
discern the object and purpose underlying the enactment of s 34(1) (a)
and para (i) of the Fourth Sched to the SCJA, namely, the
recommendations of the two judiciary-led committees mentioned
earlier, as well as the second reading speech of the relevant amendment
bill made by Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee.
62 After summarising the positions under the previous version of
the SCJA and the new approach provided for by the 2010 SCJA
amendments, the Court of Appeal stated that Parliament's intention in
passing the amendments "was to remedy the problems associated with
s 34(1)(c) of the old SCJA' namely: (a) the proliferation of appeals to
the Court of Appeal in respect of interlocutory orders; (b) the technical
and potentially draconian effects of the requirement for the no-farther-
arguments certification; and (c) the removal of the dichotomy between
"final" and "interlocutory" orders in favour of a calibrated, categories-
based approach.
63 Against that background, the Court of Appeal held that
determining whether or not an order for pre-action interrogatories fell
within para (i) of the Fourth Sched to the SCJA turned on the anterior
question of whether an application to administer pre-action
interrogatories was an "interlocutory application" for the purposes of
the SCJA.66
59 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [14]-[ 15].
60 [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183 at [56]-[57].
61 Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed.
62 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [18].
63 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [19].
64 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [45].
65 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [46]-[49].
66 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [50].
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64 The Court of Appeal cited OpenNet and agreed with the
observation there that the legislative scheme introduced by the
2010 SCJA amendments and set out in the new s 34 and the Fourth and
Fifth Scheds to the SCJA, in so far as it curtailed the rights of appeal, was
only intended to apply to orders made at the hearing of interlocutory
applications. Based on a purposive approach, para (i) of the
Fourth Sched referred to an order giving or refusing interrogatories that
is made at the hearing of an interlocutory application for interrogatories.'"
65 Such a reading was also consistent with a contextual approach
because the Fourth and Fifth Scheds ought to be understood together
with para (e) of the Fifth Sched, which establishes the default requirement
that leave of the High Court judge is required before an appeal can be
brought to the Court of Appeal from orders made at the hearing of
interlocutory applications.
66 Given that the respondent had conceded that an application for
pre-action interrogatories was not an "interlocutory application" the
Court of Appeal recognised that this was sufficient basis for it to dismiss
the application to strike out the appeal.70
67 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal proceeded to explain why the
concession was properly made, after referencing legal dictionaries as
well as the second reading speech of Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee,
as follows: 71
As a matter of principle, an application to administer pre-action
interrogatories is not an application made between the time a party
files a civil case in court and when that case is finally heard for
disposal. Rather, it is an application made by way of originating
summons and its only end is the particular relief sought in the
originating summons. Once the application for such relief has been
considered and ruled upon by the court, that matter ends and those
proceedings are not followed by any other steps leading to any trial or
further disposal of that matter. [emphasis in original]
68 The Court of Appeal noted that this position was consistent
with its earlier decision in Maldives Airport Co Ltd v GMR MalM
International Airport Pte Ltd72 and the dicta it expressed in Wellmix
Organics (International) Pte Ltd v Lau Yu Man" ("Wellmix Organics").'
67 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [51]-[52].
68 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [54].
69 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [53]-[54].
70 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [57].
71 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [58]-[60].
72 [2013] 2 SLR 449, in which the Court of Appeal decided on a preliminary objection
that an application for an injunction was not an "interlocutory application"
(cont'd on the next page)
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69 The Court of Appeal further took pains to explain why it did
not accept the possible argument that "an application for pre-action
interrogatories is in substance one that is preliminary and incidental to
proceedings which may subsequently be commenced by the party
seeking to administer those interrogatories".7 5
70 First, substantive proceedings may not necessarily be commenced
by the party seeking to administer pre-action interrogatories.
71 Second, interrogatories may be administered before the
commencement of proceedings against a person not a party to those
proceedings pursuant to 0 26A r 1(5) of the Rules of Court' and
consistent with the principle established by the House of Lords in
Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners.
72 Additionally, the Court of Appeal saw fit to deal with the
interpretation of para (e) of the Fifth Sched to the SCJA (raised by the
appellant's alternative contention that the 2010 SCJA amendments were
intended only to restrict the right of appeal against interlocutory orders
and not final orders) to provide guidance for future cases.
73 The question the Court of Appeal posed for itself was: "does the
requirement of leave under paragraph (e) of the Fifth Schedule to the
SCJA apply regardless of the type of order that is made?"7 Referring
again to the second reading speech of Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee
and agreeing with the earlier observations in OpenNet, the Court of
Appeal answered the question in the negative as the "very purpose of the
2010 amendments was to restrict appeals to the Court of Appeal from
interlocutory orders" [emphasis in original]."8
because there would be nothing further for the court to deal with once the
injunction had been either granted or refused.
73 [2006] 2 SLR(R) 525 at [16], where the Court of Appeal commented that it is
possible that an order granted in one proceeding may be interlocutory and yet the
same nature of order granted in another proceeding may be final, stating as an
example that although an order made for discovery in the course of an action for
breach of contract may be an interlocutory order, one that was made in a
proceeding instituted purely to obtain pre-action discovery would be a final order
because it "disposes of everything in the proceeding".
74 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [61]-[65].
75 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [66]-[72].
76 Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed.
77 [1974] AC 133.
78 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [75]
and [77].
79 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [79].
80 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [79]-[91].
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74 Accordingly, "order" in para (e) of the Fifth Sched, should be
read as "interlocutory order" in the light of its purpose and context.
75 Perhaps making the most of its opportunity to clarify the
approach to s 34 of the SCJA, the Court of Appeal further took on what
it viewed to be an anomalous exception to the principles that a party
applying for leave to appeal against an order or a judgment made by a
judge should file his application to the judge within seven days of the
order or judgment;" and that the order of the High Court giving or
refusing leave is final.82 That exception was that where an ex parte
application is refused at first instance, the applicant can renew the
application before the Court of Appeal within seven days after the date
of hearing under 0 57 r 16(3) of the Rules of Court.8 3
76 In the Court of Appeal's view, given that "ex parte applications
are virtually always interlocutory in nature" legislative intervention
would be desirable, because where a party is refused leave to appeal by
the High Court judge who heard the application, there is no reason why
he should not be allowed to renew his application for leave before the
Court of Appeal on such terms and in such manner as that court may
decide.'
77 Finally, the Court of Appeal summarised the principles to be
adopted in the interpretation of s 34 of the SCJA, read with the Fourth
and Fifth Scheds to the SCJA, as follows:85
(a) Ordinarily, pursuant to s 29A of the SCJA, any
judgment or order of the High Court is appealable as of right to
the Court of Appeal. This, however, is subject to any provision
in the SCJA or any other written law to the contrary.
(b) Where interlocutory applications are concerned,
ss 34(1)(a) and 34(2)(d) of the SCJA, read with the Fourth and
Fifth Scheds respectively, are examples of such provisions to the
contrary. These provisions prescribe that particular orders are
either non-appealable or appealable to the Court of Appeal only
with leave.
(c) Where specific provision has been made in s 34 of the
SCJA and in the Fourth and Fifth Scheds, that will apply on its
terms, save that para (i) of the Fourth Sched and para (c) of the
81 See 0 56 r 3(1) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed).
82 See s 34(2B) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed).
83 Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed; Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd
[2013] 3 SLR 354 at [92]-[95].
84 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [97].
85 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [98].
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Fifth Sched apply only to orders made upon interlocutory
applications.
(d) In relation to the opening words of para (e) of the
Fifth Sched to the SCJA, the reference to "order" is to be read as
a reference to an interlocutory order.
(e) Where an order is not stipulated as being non-appealable
or appealable only with leave, an appeal to the Court of Appeal
will lie as of right.
IV. Analysis of the two decisions
78 As mentioned, OpenNet and Dorsey James Michael are the first
two Court of Appeal decisions pronouncing on the interpretation of
s 34 of the SCJA after the 2010 SCJA amendments.
79 Notably, in both cases, the Court of Appeal prefaced their
analyses by citing Blenwel Agencies Pte Ltd v Tan Lee King" and
emphasising that a court is a creature of statute that is only seised of the
jurisdiction conferred upon it by statute.
80 What can be inferred from this is that it is absolutely crucial to
have a proper and clear understanding of s 34 of the SCJA as well as the
Fourth and Fifth Scheds to the SCJA to determine whether a judgment
or order of the High Court is appealable, non-appealable or only
appealable with leave (that is to say, whether the Court of Appeal has or
simply does not have the jurisdiction to hear an appeal or not for the
judgment or order in question, since jurisdiction in this instance can
only be derived from the SCJA).
81 In respect of orders in interlocutory applications, an
understanding of para (e) of the Fifth Sched is especially important
because that paragraph requires leave to appeal to be obtained unless
otherwise provided for.
82 The discussion below identifies four aspects of OpenNet and
Dorsey James Michael that warrant further investigation in subsequent
decisions: (a) the purposive approach adopted by the Court of Appeal;
(b) the framework for determining whether an order or application is
"interlocutory"; (c) the relationship between the Rules of Court and the
SCJA; and (d) possible future changes to the SCJA.
86 [2008] 2 SLR(R) 529.
87 OpenNetPte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013]
2 SLR 880 at [7]; Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354
at [10]. See also Re Nalpon Zero Geraldo Mario [2013] 3 SLR 258 at [14].
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A. The re-affirmation of the importance of the purposive
approach in interpreting statutes
83 In determining whether a judgment or order of the High Court
is appealable, non-appealable or only appealable with leave, the Court of
Appeal in OpenNet and Dorsey James Michael emphasised the primacy
of the purposive approach to statutory interpretation pursuant to
s 9A(1) of the Interpretation Act." This aspect of the cases is
uncontroversial and has been affirmed several times in earlier cases.89
84 However, this seemingly technical point requires closer
examination because the purposive approach formed the fundamental
basis of the Court of Appeal's analysis, and in this regard it is submitted
that there remains further room for clarification of the meaning of the
purposive approach and its relationship with the reference to extrinsic
material in aid of interpretation.
85 In the Court of Appeal's application of the purposive approach
in both OpenNet and Dorsey James Michael, it referred extensively to
extrinsic materials such as the second reading speech made by Associate
Professor Ho Peng Kee and the recommendations of the two judiciary-
led committees earlier mentioned.
86 The type of extrinsic material the Court of Appeal referred to is
uncontroversial and may be justified by reference to s 9A(3) of the
Interpretation Act.o The second reading speech made by Associate
Professor Ho Peng Kee was clearly permissible under s 9A(3)(c) of the
Interpretation Act and the recommendations of the two judiciary-led
committees may be argued to be permissible based on a purposive
interpretation of s 9A(3). Although there is no listed category of
materials in s 9A(3) that describe the recommendations of the two
judiciary-led committees, s 9A(3) does not purport to be exhaustive but
to "include" the listed materials."
88 Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed.
89 See Constitutional Reference No 1 of 1995 [1995] 1 SLR(R) 803; Planmarine AG v
Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore [1999] 1 SLR(R) 669 and Public
Prosecutor v Low Kok Heng [2007] 4 SLR(R) 183. However, it cannot be said that all
the cases have consistently and faithfully applied the purposive approach in the
interpretation of statutory provisions that have come before then: see, eg, Chen
Siyuan & Nathaniel Khng, "Possession and Knowledge in the Misuse of Drugs Act:
Nagaenthran a/1 K Dharmalingam v Public Prosecutor" (2012) 30 Sing L Rev 181
at 186-189.
90 Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed.
91 Goh Yihan, "Statutory Interpretation in Singapore - 15 Years on from Legislative
Reform" (2009) 21 SAcLJ 97 at 121-123, para 25.
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87 Given that the common thread running through all the listed
materials is that of relevance, the recommendations of the two
judiciary-led committees should be regarded as relevant because they
were referenced by Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee in the second
reading speech as providing the basis for the proposed amendments.
Accordingly, the type of extrinsic material that the Court of Appeal
referred to in OpenNet and Dorsey James Michael was, like the purposive
approach, also uncontroversial.
88 What requires clarification is the basis for reference to such
extrinsic material - this was left unclear by the Court of Appeal in
both cases. Section 9A(2) of the Interpretation Act92 describes the
circumstances in which consideration may be given to relevant extrinsic
material as follows:
(a) to confirm that the meaning of the provision is the ordinary
meaning conveyed by the text of the provision taking into account its
context in the written law and the purpose or object underlying the
written law; or
(b) to ascertain the meaning of the provision when -
(i) the provision is ambiguous or obscure; or
(ii) the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the
provision taking into account its context in the written law
and the purpose or object underlying the written law leads to
a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
[emphasis added]
89 It has been argued that there is a distinction between the
purposive approach, and the circumstances in which extrinsic materials
may be utilised in accordance with the purposive approach."
Section 9A(1) of the Interpretation Acte does not prescribe how the
purposive approach is to be exercised but only provides for its use. In
contrast, s 9A(2) of the Interpretation Act prescribes the circumstances
in which recourse may be had to extrinsic materials.
90 As will be explained below, in Dorsey James Michael, the Court
of Appeal did not make such a distinction, whereas in OpenNet, the
Court of Appeal seemed to appreciate the distinction but it did not
address the two specific purposes set out in sub-paras (a) and (b),
focusing only on the preamble that the court may give consideration to
92 Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed.
93 Goh Yihan, "Statutory Interpretation in Singapore - 15 Years on from Legislative
Reform" (2009) 21 SAcLJ 97 at 109-111 and 124-125, paras 12 and 28.
94 Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed.
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"any material not forming part of the written law [that] is capable of
assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning of the provision".
91 In Dorsey James Michael, the Court of Appeal had recourse to
extrinsic material to interpret "interrogatories" in the Fourth Sched to
the SCJA and the reference to "order" in the Fourth and Fifth Scheds to
the SCJA. The Court of Appeal cited the cases of Constitutional
Reference No 1 of 199595 and Planmarine AG v Maritime and Port
Authority of Singapore6 for the proposition that reference may be made
to extrinsic materials even if the words of the statutory provision are
unambiguous or do not produce unreasonable or absurd results. This
was certainly correct as these circumstances were contained in
s 9A(2)(b) of the Interpretation Act97 - there was still s 9A(2)(a) of the
Interpretation Act.
92 However, s 9A(2) (a) required the extrinsic material to be used
to confirm that the meaning of the provision is the ordinary meaning
conveyed by the text taking into account its context in the written law
and the purpose or object underlying the written law.
93 It seemed that the Court of Appeal took it as a matter of course
that reference to extrinsic material was part of the purposive approach
and, in addition to the purposes stated in s 9A(2), extrinsic material may
be referenced to ascertain the purpose of object underlying the written law.
This could have been an opportunity for the Court of Appeal to clarify
the meaning of the purposive approach and what it entailed.
94 One way to read s 9A(2) as providing a very broad assisting role
in interpretation and accordingly permitting reference to extrinsic
material whenever the purposive approach is applied has been suggested
by one academic as follows:8
This approach could be justified on the basis that if, say, the
purposively reached meaning was not ambiguous or absurd, and the
court seeks extrinsic materials to confirm this meaning but, upon
doing so, realises that there is now a better meaning to promote the
purpose and object of the Act. If so, there is, by definition, an
ambiguity or absurdity such that s 9A(2)(b) operates seamlessly to
permit the court to adopt a different meaning. It might be better to
treat ss 9A(2)(a) and 9A(2)(b) as operating seamlessly with one
another, with one ready to take over the other should the
circumstances permit upon the consideration of the extrinsic materials.
95 [1995] 1 SLR(R) 803.
96 [1999] 1 SLR(R) 669.
97 Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed.
98 Goh Yihan, "Statutory Interpretation in Singapore - 15 Years on from Legislative
Reform" (2009) 21 SAcLJ 97 at 130, para 37.
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95 In OpenNet, the Court of Appeal appeared to distinguish
between the purposive approach and the reference to extrinsic materials
as it stated as follows before referring to the second reading speech:99
According to s 9A(2) (read with s 9A(3)(c)) of the Interpretation Act,
consideration may be given to a piece of material which is 'capable of
assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning of the provision,
including 'the speech made in Parliament by a Minister on the
occasion of the moving by that Minister of a motion that the Bill
containing the provision be read a second time in Parliament.
96 However, this statement does seem to ignore the specific
purposes described in sub-paras (a) and (b). The Court of Appeal could
have simply explained which it was proceeding under for better clarity.
In the circumstances, it was possible that the reference to extrinsic
material in this case fell within the confirmatory purpose described in
sub-para (a), or within the first limb of sub-para (b) because the SCJA
did not define the phrase "interlocutory application" and the legal
dictionary definitions did not satisfactorily resolve the issue.
97 Alternatively, the Court of Appeal could also have adopted the
approach suggested above of reading s 9A(2) broadly to cover all
conceivable circumstances. In that way, the purposive approach under
the Interpretation Act would always involve reference to extrinsic
material - the only controlling mechanism would then be how much
weight to place on such material pursuant to s 9A(4) of the
Interpretation Act. 00
B. "Interlocutory orders" and "interlocutory applications"
98 Due to para (e) of the Fifth Sched, the default position in the
absence of express provision for all orders made in interlocutory
applications (generally understood to mean applications made before
the substantive trial)0 ' is that they are appealable only with leave of
court.102
99 OpenNet and Dorsey James Michael seek to provide clarification
as to how "interlocutory application" in para (e) of the Fifth Sched
and "order" under para (i) of the Fourth Sched and para (e) of the
Fifth Sched ought to be interpreted. However, one may question
whether both decisions have managed to succeed in doing so.
99 OpenNetPte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013]
2 SLR 880 at [16].
100 Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed.
101 OpenNetPte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013]
2 SLR 880 at [14].
102 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [46].
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100 The test laid down in OpenNet for interlocutory applications
within the meaning of the SCJA appears to be applications that do not
"have the effect of finally disposing of the substantive rights of the
parties"o1
101 If this test is not satisfied, that is, the application has the effect
of finally disposing of the substantive rights of the parties, then an order
made in that application should be appealable as of right. If the test is
satisfied, then one must examine whether the order is appealable with
leave or non-appealable by reference to the Fourth Sched of the SCJA.
102 This test for an "interlocutory application" in OpenNet appears
to be taken from the case of Bozson v Altrincham Urban District
Council10 4 ("Bozson"), although the Court of Appeal did not reference it.
In Bozson, Lord Alverston CJ had formulated a test for distinguishing
between an interlocutory and final order as follows:1 05
Does the judgement or order, as made, finally dispose of the rights of
the parties? If it does ... it ought to be treated as a final order; but if it
does not, it is then ... an interlocutory order.
103 The Bozson test was approved by the Singapore Court of Appeal
in the pre-2010 SCJA amendments case of Wellmix Organics after
considering the other tests developed in the case law seeking to
distinguish between an "interlocutory" and "final" order.
104 It could be that the Court of Appeal deliberately chose not to
refer to the Bozson test because it regarded the present SCJA as
introducing a new regime where that test was not strictly relevant. As
it later explained, the reference to "interlocutory order" in 0 53 r 8 of
the Rules of Court"' was a "relic of the past" and part of the regime
under the former s 34(1)(c) of the SCJA where the no-further-arguments
certification was required for an "interlocutory order". Nevertheless,
as a matter of substance, the test applied in OpenNet for an
103 OpenNet Pte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013]
2 SLR 880 at [18].
104 [1903] 1 KB 547.
105 Bozson vAltrincham Urban District Council [1903] 1 KB 547 at 548. See also Jeffrey
Pinsler, Principles of Civil Procedure (Academy Publishing, 2013) at p 947:
The principle governing [appeals is]: 'The resources necessary for an appeal
must be justified by the amount or value at stake or the significance of the
issue to be raised before the appellate court.' The principle involves
considerations such as the need for a further appeal, the relationship between
the interlocutory matter and the substantive issues in the case, the finality of
the order, whether the applicable legal rules are straightforward or
complicated, and the impact of the order on the other party.
106 Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed.
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"interlocutory application" seems to be another re-incarnation of the
familiar Bozson test.
105 It may be said then that although the Court of Appeal may not
have intended it, the effect of OpenNet was to re-introduce the difficulty
of trying to distinguish between "interlocutory" and "final" orders."'
106 The Court of Appeal's later decision of Dorsey James Michael
arguably raises more questions in this respect. Oddly enough, despite
expressly stating earlier on that one of the purposes of the 2010 SCJA
amendments was to remove the dichotomy between "interlocutory" and
"final" orders, the Court of Appeal in Dorsey James Michael proceeded
to endorse and apply the Bozson test as well as Wellmix Organics in
determining whether or not an application to administer pre-action
interrogatories was an interlocutory application within the meaning of
the SCJA.s08
107 Further, the Court of Appeal later expressly re-introduced
the phrase "interlocutory order" to the SCJA by holding that "order"
as referenced in para (i) of the Fourth Sched and para (e) of the
Fifth Sched referred to "interlocutory orders" made in "interlocutory
applications".o
108 Ironically, one commentator had observed after considering the
case of OpenNet that "it is absolutely clear now that the language of
'interlocutor order' is no longer applicable under the new legislative
framework"1' 0
109 The High Court in Chen Chun Kang v Zhao Meirong... also
seemed to appreciate that a key distinction between the former s 34 of
the SCJA and the present version was that the former required the court
to apply the test of whether a judgment or order was interlocutory or
final, whereas the latter required the court to decide whether the
summons before it was an "interlocutory application.112
107 See Downeredi Works Pte Ltd v Holcim (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2009] 1 SLR(R) 1070
at [34] and Chen Chun Kang v Zhao Meirong [2012] 1 SLR 817 at [32].
108 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [63]-[65].
109 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [79]-[85].
110 In Douglas Chi, "Clarification on Leave to Appeal Regime in Respect of
Interlocutory Matters - OpenNet Pte Ltd v Info-Communications Development
Authority of Singapore [2013] SGCA 24" (April 2013) Issue 1 Singapore Law Watch
Commentary at 3-4 <http://www.singaporelawwatch.com/slwindex.phpcommentaries>
(accessed 5 May 2013), the author inferred this from the Court of Appeal's
reasoning in OpenNet, in particular its failure to reference the Bozson test and
Wellmix Organics.
111 [2012] 1 SLR 817.
112 Chen Chun Kang v Zhao Meirong [2012] 1 SLR 817 at [32]-[33].
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110 However, it turns out that according to Dorsey James Michael,
the Legislature's intention by way of the 2010 SCJA amendments was
that only interlocutory orders made in interlocutory applications be
subject to the catch-all provision in para (e) of the Fifth Sched and only
interlocutory orders be captured by para (i) of the Fourth Sched (and by
logical extension the entirety of the Fourth Sched).
111 Another possibly confusing aspect of reading both OpenNet and
Dorsey James Michael is that one is left at a loss as to the test to apply to
determine if an application is an "interlocutory application" within the
meaning of the SCJA.
112 Apart from endorsing the Bozson test, the Court of Appeal in
Dorsey James Michael also appeared to endorse the legal dictionary
definitions for "interlocutory application", namely, an application that is
"peripheral to the main hearing determining the outcome of the case""
or one that is " [d] uring the course of proceedings ... occurring between
the initiation of the action and the final determination"" on the basis
that they were consonant with the meaning attributed by Associate
Professor Ho Peng Kee to that phrase in the second reading speech.
113 In contrast, the Court of Appeal in OpenNet had referred to
similar dictionary definitions but stated that they "do not resolve
the issue".115
114 The Court of Appeal in Dorsey James Michael then went on to
decide that pre-action interrogatories were not "interlocutory applications"
within the meaning of the SCJA because they were not "made between
the time a party files a civil case in court and when that case is finally
heard for disposal" [emphasis in original], and "[o]nce the application
for such relief has been considered and ruled upon by the court, that
matter ends ""'
115 Reading OpenNet and Dorsey James Michael together, one may
argue that the legal dictionary definitions of "interlocutory application"
still remain relevant and are perhaps an alternative to the "finally
disposing of the substantive rights of parties" test.
116 Alternatively, it could also be that the various definitions
referred to are merely factors or indicia to be considered rather than
113 Jowitt's Dictionary ofEnglish Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd Ed, 2010).
114 Oxford Dictionary ofLaw (Oxford University Press, 7th Ed, 2009).
115 OpenNetPte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013]
2 SLR 880 at [14].
116 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [60].
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tests."' Regardless, as compared with the previous position under the
SCJA, the present position does not appear to bring significant
improvement in terms of certainty and clarity.
C. Relationship between the Rules of Court and the SCIA
117 In OpenNet, the Court of Appeal rejected the respondent's
argument that if "interlocutory application" under para (e) of the
Fifth Sched of the SCJA does not include an application for leave to
commence judicial review by way of an originating summons, 0 53 r 8
of the Rules of Court"' would be rendered nugatory and otiose.
118 In its reasoning process, the Court of Appeal implicitly
recognised that subsidiary legislation such as the Rules of Court cannot
be used to arrive at an interpretation of the primary legislation that
would not promote its object and purpose.
119 In fact, s 19(c) of the Interpretation Act"' provides that "no
subsidiary legislation made under an Act shall be inconsistent with the
provisions of any Act" The Court of Appeal took the correct approach
in examining the link of the predecessor provision of 0 53 r 8 to the
SCJA with the repealed s 34(1)(c) of the previous version of the SCJA to
discover that 0 53 r 8 appeared to be a "relic of the past"'20
120 However, in Dorsey James Michael, the Court of Appeal was
rather troubled by the "apparently anomalous exception", contained
within 0 57 r 16(3) of the Rules of Court,121 to the proposition in
s 34(2B) of the SCJA that the order of a High Court judge giving or
refusing leave is final and that in 0 56 r 3(1) of the Rules of Court 22
which requires a party applying for leave to appeal under s 34 of the
SCJA to apply to the judge who gave the order or made the judgment at
first instance.123
121 Order 57 r 16(3) provides that: "Where an ex parte application
has been refused by the Court below, an application for a similar
117 See Douglas Chi, "Clarification on Leave to Appeal Regime in Respect of
Interlocutory Matters - OpenNet Pte Ltd v Info-Communications Development
Authority of Singapore [2013] SGCA 24" (April 2013) Issue 1 Singapore Law Watch
Commentary at 4 <http://www.singaporelawwatch.com/slw/index.php/commentaries>
(accessed 5 May 2013).
118 Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed.
119 Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed.
120 OpenNet Pte Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013]
2 SLR 880 at [29].
121 Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed.
122 Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed.
123 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [93]-[95].
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purpose may be made to the Court of Appeal ex parte within 7 days
after the date of the refusal.'
122 It is submitted that any anomaly can be cured by properly
interpreting 0 57 r 16(3) in the context of s 34 of the SCJA given s 19(c)
of the Interpretation Act.1 24
123 The Court of Appeal read 0 57 r 15(3) as meaning that a party
in an ex parte application is entitled to two tiers of hearing including
one before the Court of Appeal as of right. This is not necessarily true.
124 Section 34 of the SCJA deals with types of applications and
would still apply regardless of whether the application in question was
brought inter partes or ex parte. Order 57 r 16(3) can be read subject to
s 34 of the SCJA, that is, to provide for the mode by which an ex parte
application refused by the High Court may be made to the Court of
Appeal where s 34 of the SCJA does not apply to require leave to appeal
or render an application non-appealable.
125 Accordingly, 0 57 r 16(3) would apply, for instance, to
applications for freezing orders and search orders. It would also apply to
applications for leave to appeal to which s 34(2) of the SCJA does not
apply and where leave to appeal may be sought from the Court of
Appeal. One example would be an application for leave to appeal against
the decision of the High Court in proceedings under Pt X of the
Women's Charter, 125 which may be obtained from the Court of Appeal
pursuant to the Supreme Court of Judicature (Transfer of Matrimonial,
Divorce and Guardianship of Infants Proceedings to District Court)
Order 2007.126
126 However, where leave to appeal is required under s 34 of the
SCJA read with the Fourth or Fifth Sched, then 0 57 r 16(3) does not
apply. Such a reading would be consistent with the object and purpose
of s 34 of the SCJA.
127 It is therefore submitted that 0 57 r 16(3) ought not to have
troubled the Court of Appeal in Dorsey James Michael as the subsidiary
legislation may be read consistently with the SCJA in the light of s 19(c)
of the Interpretation Act. 127
124 Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed.
125 Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed.
126 S 672/2007, para 6.
127 Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed.
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D. Possible future changes to the SCIA
128 The Court of Appeal in Dorsey James Michael invited future
legislative change to the SCJA with its comment that it saw no reason
why a party who is refused leave to appeal by a High Court judge who
heard the application "should not be allowed to renew his application
for leave before the Court of Appeal on such terms and in such manner
as that court may decide".128
129 This statement plainly contradicts the proposition stated in
s 34(2B) of the SCJA which the Court of Appeal alluded to earlier, that
an order of a High Court judge giving or refusing leave under s 34(2) of
the SCJA shall be final.
130 It also raises the question of whether the Court of Appeal
intended its comment to apply to situations where a High Court judge,
different from the judge making the order or giving the judgment
appealed against, heard the application for leave.
131 If so, this would similarly contradict the proposition stated in
0 56 r 3(1) of the Rules of Court,129 and which was defended by
Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee in Parliament during the second
reading of the 2010 SCJA Amendment Bill,13 1 that an application for
leave to appeal should be made to the same judge who gave the order or
made the judgment at first instance.
132 Taking the Court of Appeal's comment at its broadest, it appears
that the Court of Appeal is suggesting, to some extent, a return to the
former position before the 2010 SCJA amendments, where leave to
appeal applications heard by High Court judges were not final as well as
a change to the traditional practice... of the same High Court judge who
128 Dorsey James Michael v World Sport Group Pte Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 354 at [97].
129 Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed.
130 See Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (18 October 2010) vol 87
at col 1367 (Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee, Senior Minister of State, Ministry of
Law and Ministry of Home Affairs), where it was stated, inter alia, as follows:
Sir, first of all, I should say that the amendments do not introduce a new
practice because this practice already exists - getting leave from the High
Court Judge who hears the case. Indeed, I understand, this is also the practice
in other countries, such as the UK. I think the key point really is that we must
expect our High Court Judges who are men and women of experience and
integrity to grant leave when it is justified. And, in fact, the High Court Judge
who gave the original order and who is the one most familiar with the case is
best placed to make this call as to whether the facts of legal issues raised merit
further consideration by the Court of Appeal.
131 See Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (18 October 2010) vol 87
at col 1367 (Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee, Senior Minister of State, Ministry of
Law and Ministry of Home Affairs).
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made the order or gave the judgment being appealed against hearing the
application for leave to appeal.
133 Although the basis for and the scope of its suggestion appears
unclear, the authors would agree that this may be an appropriate time to
review the new approach towards leave to appeal applications brought
about by the 2010 SCJA amendments given that some circumstances
relating to the justification for those amendments have changed.
134 For example, there have been recent changes introduced to the
Court of Appeal practice by way of amendments to the Supreme Court
Practice Directions,132 and there has also been a shift "to a modified
docket system of litigation""' as announced by Sundaresh Menon CJ at
the beginning of the year. These changes will more likely than not
increase the current workloads of the High Court and the Court of
Appeal and require recalibration of the contents of the three-pronged
categories approach.3
135 It is also worthwhile considering simplifying the current
approach, which as described earlier, is cumbersome and requires cross-
referencing between the text of s 34 and the Fourth and Fifth Scheds to
the SCJA. Even if the Fourth and Fifth Scheds are to be maintained, it
would be best if the lists do not themselves contain exceptions, or if they
do, it should be specified whether in the exceptional circumstances the
order is appealable as of right, non-appealable, or appealable only with
leave of the court.
136 Finally, given the earlier observations that the cases of OpenNet
and Dorsey James Michael appear to have re-introduced the distinction
between "interlocutory" and "final" orders that the 2010 SCJA
amendments had sought to remove as well as brought about some
difficulty in terms of the appropriate test to apply to determine
whether an order or application is "interlocutory" within the meaning
of the SCJA, further legislative clarification may be desirable to
provide an express definition of the phrases "interlocutory order" and
"interlocutory application".
132 See Supreme Court Practice Directions (Amendment No 1 of 2013)
<http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.aspx?pgID=4601> (accessed 5 May 2013).
133 See Response by Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, Opening of the Legal Year 2013
and Welcome Reference for the Chief Justice (4 January 2013) at paras 31-32
<http://app.sc.gov.sg/data/OLY%202013%20-%20CJ%2OSpeech%200LY%20
Welcome%20Reference.pdf> (accessed 5 May 2013).
134 See Chua Hui Han, Eunice, "Defining an 'Interlocutory Application' - OpenNet Pte
Ltd v Info-Communications Development Authority of Singapore [2013] SGCA 24"
(April 2013) Issue 2 Singapore Law Watch Commentary at 5-6 <http://www.singapore
lawwatch.com/slw/index.php/commentaries> (accessed 5 May 2013).
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V. Conclusion
137 OpenNet and Dorsey James Michael will unlikely be the last word
on the proper interpretation of s 34 and the Fourth and Fifth Scheds to
the SCJA. While possible future legislative changes are being awaited,
the techniques of statutory interpretation contained within the
Interpretation Act will have to suffice to determine whether an order
made by a High Court judge is appealable as of right, non-appealable, or
appealable only with leave of court.
138 In summary, a suggested practical approach to making such a
determination based on the current positions in OpenNet and Dorsey
James Michael is as follows:
(a) Where an application is "interlocutory" as ordinarily
understood (that is, where the application is peripheral to the
main hearing determining the outcome of the case, or one that
occurs during the course of proceedings between the initiation
of the action and the final determination), one will have to
apply the tests in OpenNet and Dorsey James Michael (informed
by the object and purpose of the 2010 SCJA amendments) to
determine if the application and the order made in that
application are "interlocutory" in nature within the meaning of
the SCJA.
(b) If so, then pursuant to ss 34(1)(a) and 34(2)(d) of the
SCJA, read with the Fourth and Fifth Scheds respectively, such
"interlocutory" orders in "interlocutory" applications are either
appealable only with leave of court or are non-appealable.
(i) The orders and applications that are
non-appealable are stated in the Fourth Sched to the
SCJA.
(ii) The orders and applications that are appealable
only with leave of court are stated in the Fifth Sched to
the SCJA.
(iii) Where no explicit reference is made to the
order and application in question in the Fourth and
Fifth Scheds to the SCJA, then the catch-all provision in
para (e) of the Fifth Sched to the SCJA applies such that
leave to appeal is required.
(c) If not, then the order made by the High Court in that
application is appealable as of right pursuant to s 29A(1) of the
SCJA.
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